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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

result. Instead of harsh, fixed rules of law the court looked to the
facts and circumstances of the case to determine where the equities
lay.
M. J. P.
Torrs - VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF DuTy - FlimIAL ToRT
CLIs Acr.-Action by barge charterer and others, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for damages sustained when a tug went
aground and the cargo on a barge towed by it was damaged allegedly because of the negligent operation of a lighthouse by the
coast guard. The coast guard personnel failed to check the equipment and to make the necessary repairs, and they failed to give
warning that the light was not operating. Held, that the coast guard,
having undertaken to provide lighthouse service, had a duty to use
due care to make certain that the lighthouse was kept in good working order and to use due care to discover failure of the light, to repair the same, or to give warning that it was not functioning; and if
the coast guard failed to do so and damages were thereby caused to
the petitioners, the United States was liable under the Tort Claims
Act. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 122 (1955)
(5-4 decision).
The old common law maxim that the 'Idngcould do no wrong"
has been disregarded in the United States. Here the sovereign can
be sued, but not without consent. In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims
Act was enacted. The relevant provisions are: ". . . the district
courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages.., for injury or loss
... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1952). "The United States shall be liable...
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior
to judgment or for punitive damages." Id. § 2674. Negligence was
admitted in the principal case. The question was whether this was
a type of negligence for which the government had consented to
be sued.
In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), it was held
that members of the armed services injured through the negligence
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of other military personnel could not sue the United States under
this statute because the plaintiffs could not point to any liability
of a private individual even remotely analogous to that which they
were asserting against the United States. No private individual has
power to conscript a private army. The court admitted that some
private liabilities might have a few similar characteristics, but held
that the liability assumed by the government is that created by all
the circumstances, not that which a few of the circumstances might
create. Such a suit was not possible before the statute and the
court held that the act was not intended to create new liabilities;
it was intended only to waive immunity as to existing causes. Thus
the court construed the statute strictly in favor of the government,
holding that uniquely governmental activities created no liabilities
for the negligence on the part of its employees.
In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), the government authorized the use of certain explosive materials in the manufacture of fertilizer which it then stored in a seaport awaiting shipment. As a result, violent explosions occurred when a fire was
started in the port. The government was held not liable for the storage of the fertilizer under the "discretionary functions" exception in
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1952). However, the coast guard was found
negligent in its fire fighting duties. The court again held that the
government was not liable because no similar private liability
existed. ".... if anything is doctrinally sanctified in the law of torts,
it is the immunity of communities and other public bodies for the
injuries due to fighting fire."
Both of these cases seem to hold that there can be no governmental liability for the negligence of employees where the activity
is uniquely governmental. By statute, 14 U.S.C. 81 (1952) the
coast guard is given the power to maintain lighthouses, and by
statute, id. § 83, this right is made exclusive. Thus the maintenance
of lighthouses is made a uniquely governmental function. From this
it follows that the government would not be liable for the negligent
operation of the lighthouse in the principal case. However, the
court seems to create an exception to the general rule. It says,
'. . . it is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the

public of danger and thereby induces 'reliance must perform his
'good samaritan' task in a careful manner." The statute, 14 U.S.c.
§ 81 (1952), does not require the coast guard to maintain'lighthouses; it merely provides that the coast guard "may" maintain
navigation aids. Thus when the coast guard undertakes such'an
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activity, engendering reliance thereon, it has a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of the lighthouses or to warn the
public that the lighthouses are no longer operating properly. The
Court does not look to the specific activity; it merely looks to the
fact that the government has undertaken something which it is
not required to do. A private individual in similar circumstances
would be liable if he did not use reasonable care. Thus the statute
makes the government liable.
The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952), lists several exceptions
to the statute granting consent for the government to be sued. The
Feres and Dalehite cases add one more-the government does not
consent to be sued for negligence in the performance of uniquely
governmental activities. This exception is now limited by the decision in the principal case. The court distinguishes between unique
activities which the government is required to undertake and those
which it is not required to undertake. The statute establishes liability for negligence in the performance of the latter.
W. A. K.

WoKMxEW's COMPENSAION-MEANING AND EFFECT oF CAsuAL

EMPLOYER PRovso.-In an action to recover damages for injuries
suffered while plaintiff was driving a truck belonging to the defendant, the circuit court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and the
defendant prosecuted a writ of error. Held, on appeal, that where
defendant, engaged in a business, although operating it intermittently, had employed plaintiff as a sawyer and truck driver for
approximately two years, plaintiff working regularly six days a week
and being paid at regular twoweek intervals, defendant was an
employer within the workmen's compensation statute; and plaintiff's contributory negligence and assumption of risk were not available as defenses. Walls v. McKinney, 81 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1954).
In the principal case, the court, at page 906, says, "The record
in this case shows that the defendant was not a casual employer.
• . ." This treatment of who is or is not a casual employer within
the meaning of W. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1949), is
probably of no importance in the principal case insofar as the result
is concerned, because the defendant probably had more than three
employees. However, it does raise, and leaves unanswered, some
interesting questions concerning the definition of "casual employers"
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